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ABSTRACT 
 
Colin Biddle 
International Failure in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
The Problem with Local Ownership 
(Under the direction of Robert M. Jenkins) 
 
International peacekeepers completed the military mission of peace 
implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this paper argues that divisions within 
the international community undermine the civilian mission of international institutions 
such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR) while weak political competition 
among local elites allows nationalist political parties to block reconciliation. Intervention 
is the only method to improve the political process. Local ownership would be extremely 
detrimental, but the international community seems either unwilling or unable to sustain 
pressure on Bosnian institutions. Strong support of the civilian mission is necessary to 
introduce constitutional reforms that develop an integrative model of power-sharing. 
Normative pressure has not coerced elites to comply and additional peacekeeping troops 
are unlikely, therefore international institutions should implement more aggressive 
financial incentives for Bosnian elites to complete constitutional reform. 
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Chapter I  
A Moral Imperative 
 
It was a warm night in late summer on the road near Počitelj. I was returning to 
Sarajevo with friends from a weekend in Dubrovnik. The countryside rolled by in 
darkness. The headlights from our car captured only a few meters of the road in front of 
us. I began to drift off to sleep in the front passenger seat but snapped awake when my 
Bosnian friend who was driving suddenly hit the brakes. A policeman appeared in the 
road. Nothing happened for several long seconds until my friend grabbed her wallet and 
jumped out of the car. I watched with curiosity as she and the policeman had a calm 
conversation along the side of the road. They exchanged a few pieces of paper before she 
casually returned to the car and we went on our way. I found out that we had been 
speeding, but I was led to understand that it was no longer a problem. No one said 
anything for several minutes until she suddenly blurted out, “I hate this country, nothing 
works here.” 
 I listened and chose to say nothing, but the event illustrated the limits of reforms 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) after 15 years of efforts led by the international 
community. From 1992-1995, BiH’s leaders mobilized nationalist armies and 
paramilitary units for the purpose of ethnic cleansing. BiH experienced the worst 
genocide in Europe since World War II. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed in 
the fighting. The international community intervened to stop a humanitarian crisis and 
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ended the war in 1995, but then remained in BiH in the post-war period to prevent 
another crisis.  
At the end of the Bosnian War, the international community implemented the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton 
Accords). Dayton established the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to 
“coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian 
aspects of the peace settlement.”1 Following Dayton, the international community 
decided to amend the responsibilities of the OHR. The OHR received virtually unlimited 
political authority through the Bonn Powers that in practice allow the OHR to impose any 
law and dismiss any politician within BiH.  
The OHR represents the Contact Group (US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and 
Russia), the states who took an active interest in peacemaking in BiH, along with the 
broader array of concerned states who wish to see peace in BiH, such as the EU and 
many NATO countries. The OHR represents this community’s collective interest: a 
peaceful, democratic BiH. Following the end of hostilities, these nations set it upon 
themselves to aid BiH in its growth as a stable, democratic country.2 The OHR’s 
authority has a moral component. Obviously, it has the legitimate interest to prevent 
another war in BiH. It also represents the economic weight of the countries that support 
                                                 
1
 Dayton establishes the OHR as the leading institution for civilian reform in BiH, granting the OHR a 
position on the provisional election commission (Annex 3), chairmanship of the Joint Interim Commission 
for implementation of Dayton and the Constitution of BiH (Annex 4), and the ability to “facilitate, as the 
High Representative judges necessary, the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civilian 
implementation” (Annex 10). See OHR, “The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.” 14 December 1995. Available at http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380. 
Accessed 12 January 2010. 
 
2
 See also, Boris Kabanoff and Joseph Daly, “Espoused Values of Organisations,” Australian Journal of 
Management (2002): 89-104.  
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it. The OHR can politically influence the terms that the international community 
establishes for foreign aid to BiH.  
In theory, the OHR possesses an immediate and unprecedented influence on BiH 
politics. On paper the Bonn Powers provide an ultimate means of coercion. The 
international community not only granted itself the ability to set conditions, but also gave 
itself the theoretical ability to enact them. In reality, however, the Bonn Powers are only 
based on the moral authority of the international community to carry out justice and 
protect democracy. They have a normative influence on Bosnian politics, but without a 
physical means of coercion the Bonn Powers have very little effect.  
The OHR, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), EU 
Police Mission (EUPM) and other civilian institutions, however, represent only one 
aspect of international intervention in BiH. The international community’s first post-war 
goal was peace implementation. To complete this goal, NATO’s Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) deployed to BiH to physically implement peace. In accordance with Annex 1B of 
Dayton, SFOR separated the factions, transferred land and stored heavy military 
weapons. SFOR peacekeepers, however, were also able to aide civilian institutions. 
SFOR provided a physical means of coercion to enforce the OHR’s mandate, but SFOR’s 
mission ended when peace implementation was completed.3 
 
Disorganized Internationals and Strong Political Parties 
This paper will argue that the external and internal dimensions of Bosnian politics 
are failing to promote reconciliation. Externally, when peace returned to BiH, the 
                                                 
3
 “Keeping the Peace.” NewsHour Transcript, 22 December 1997. Available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/bosnia/july-dec97/bosnia_12-22.html. Accessed 2 March 2010. 
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international community lost cohesion on its goals. With SFOR’s mission complete, 
much of the international community shifted its focus towards institution-building and 
Europeanization. The West hopes to increase the opportunity costs for elites who resist 
reforms by building strong central institutions in BiH that are connected to the larger 
European system. The OHR still possesses a normative means of coercion (the Bonn 
Powers) to force local elites to comply with this goal, but SFOR’s mission officially 
ended in 2004 and EUFOR’s Operation Althea has dwindled in recent years.4 Without 
SFOR, the OHR lost much of its ability to coerce Bosnian politicians to comply with the 
Bonn Powers, but now even civilian international involvement in BiH is hotly debated. 
Academic critics of intervention label the Bonn Powers “draconian,” arguing that the 
time has come for local elites to take ownership of the political process. Chandler calls 
for the closing of the OHR to facilitate the country’s democratic transition, arguing that 
the international community’s involvement is too heavy-handed. Meanwhile, Knaus and 
Martin suggest that the OHR’s authority in BiH blurs the line between Europeanization 
and liberal imperialism.5 In political circles, states such as Russia, as a member of the 
Peace Implementation Council (PIC) with political oversight of the OHR, has repeatedly 
                                                 
4
 See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO ends SFOR mission.” NATO Update, 2 December 2004. 
Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/12-december/e1202a.htm. Accessed 12 March 2010; 
EUFOR Althea, “EUFOR History.” Available at 
http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=29.  Accessed 
12 March 2010.  
 
5
 This is an extremely large and important debate. Many consider the international community’s 
involvement to be too strict, especially in the days of High Representative Paddy Ashdown. See David 
Chandler, “The EU and Bosnia after Dayton: The Reform of International Policy towards Bosnia,” Studia 
Diplomatica (2006): 95-116; Gerhard Knaus and Felix Martin, “Travails of the European Raj,” Journal of 
Democracy (2003): 60-74. 
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opposed EU-led efforts in BiH that would strengthen BiH’s ties to the West, such as the 
continuance of the OHR.6  
On the internal side, the lack of political competition in Bosnian society has 
produced little incentive for local elites to cooperate. Ethnic tensions are high and a 
strong civic identity has not formed. Local politicians have stubbornly resisted interethnic 
cooperation with no real threat of being removed from office because of weak political 
opposition and a weakened OHR. The reluctance of the international community to 
support continued involvement is counterproductive because it emboldens Bosnian 
politicians to avoid cooperation. Unlike much of Central and Eastern Europe, the Western 
Balkans does not have a strong attachment to Europeanization. Removing the 
international means of coercion and influence has not and will not improve BiH’s 
chances for long-term peace and Europeanization. As Joseph argues, local ownership in 
the political process is dangerous and irresponsible when local institutions increase 
tensions.7 International institutions exert undemocratic influence in BiH, but locals have 
clearly shown that they are not ready to cooperate. Continued international involvement, 
therefore, is better than the alternative but effective intervention is not realistic without 
strong international support. 
                                                 
6
 See Tomas Valasek, “Is Russia a partner to the EU in Bosnia?” Centre for European Reform, 19 March 
2009. Available at http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/pb_tv_bosnia_19march09.pdf. Accessed 15 March 2010; 
“OHR’s decisions do not contribute to Bosnian stability – Russian envoy,” BBC Monitoring Europe – 
Political, 9 October 2009. Database on-line. Available from LexisNexis Academic. Accessed 10 March 
2010; “West wants to curb Russia’s influence in Bosnia – unnamed international official,” BBC Monitoring 
Europe – Political, 27 June 2008. Database on-line. Available from LexisNexis Academic. Accessed 10 
March 2010.  
 
7
 See Edward P. Joseph, “Ownership is Over-rated,” SAIS Review (2007): 109-123. 
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Knaus is correct that international involvement in BiH uncomfortably resembles 
foreign imperialism, but serious threats to peace in BiH clearly remain.8 I will 
demonstrate that Bosnian institutions are not capable of bringing about their own 
democratic reforms without outside influence. Local elites successfully frustrate reform 
efforts and maintain the status quo because they have the legal ability to do so. The 
Dayton Accords established a strongly decentralized government structure within BiH. 
Central state institutions have limited authority while entity and cantonal governments 
have greater control over their own affairs. Entity, cantonal and even municipal leaders 
have fought reforms on issues such as education, refugee return and election law. RS 
Prime Minister Milorad Dodik openly confronted the international community’s efforts to 
reform the Dayton system at the recent Butmir Talks. Dodik challenges the legitimacy of 
a strongly centralized Bosnian state, an aim for which the international community claims 
to be shooting.9 Politicians such as Dodik must notice that the OHR hesitates to use the 
Bonn Powers, making the actual implementation of a potential Bonn Power decision even 
more difficult.10  
                                                 
8
 BiH, particularly, is awash with various cultural and religious minorities—competing traditions inherited 
from centuries of imperial division and subjugation. Knaus discusses this through the eyes of a Western 
observer, asserting that the Balkans seem “wild” to the West and in need of foreign direction. Knaus argues 
that the international community skips over achievements by local politicians. This may be true, but 
democratic actions by a few politicians does not mean that BiH is ready to govern itself. It is precisely 
because of the Balkans’ history of foreign rule that today there are so many different cultural and religious 
groups with competing interests who make BiH difficult to govern. See Gerhard Knaus, “Why the Turks 
could not have built the bridge in Mostar – reflection on Bosnia.” Rumeli Observer, 3 August 2008. 
Available at http://www.esiweb.org/rumeliobserver/2008/08/03/why-the-turks-could-not-have-built-the-
bridge-in-mostar/. Accessed 29 January 2010. 
 
9
 Inherent in my argument is the Westphalian assumption that the international community wishes to 
preserve the existence of a unified Bosnian state. 
 
10
 Very recently, Dodik has openly challenged the legitimacy of the OHR in BiH. In an unusual departure 
from its previous ritualistic tradition, at a recent meeting the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board 
did not even discuss setting a deadline for closing the OHR in 2010. See Bosnia Daily, 12, 13, 16, 20 
October 2009; “PIC Steering Board consults with BiH leaders.” SETimes.com, 19 November 2009. 
Available at 
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  The international community once had the necessary cohesion for peace 
implementation in BiH, but now is unwilling to provide the OHR with the sustained 
means of coercion necessary to complete Europeanization. Despite its potential 
overwhelming political dominance over BiH, the OHR as an institution no longer has the 
authority to enact its decisions because the international community (including former 
High Representatives) removed the necessary tools or undermined the political authority 
of the OHR. Peacekeeping troops provide a physical means of coercion to enforce 
decisions, but without the immediate threat of armed conflict, members of the 
international community withdrew troops and even began to question the OHR’s role. 
Major NATO contributors such as the US are now looking elsewhere to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This damaged the OHR’s ability to influence the decisions of some Bosnian 
elites. Skeptics also attacked the legitimacy of the OHR’s political authority over BiH, 
which gained traction internationally.  
 I will present my argument in four sections. Section one will examine the legal 
framework for BiH established under the Dayton Accords. I will demonstrate that the 
Dayton system itself reinforces nationalism, which necessitates continued international 
involvement in BiH. While the international community signed the Dayton Accords to 
bring peace to a unified BiH, the political system that it setup reinforced nationalist 
differences. The second section will provide a summary of the OHR’s use of the Bonn 
Powers to enact reforms in BiH. I will show how earlier High Representatives such as 
Paddy Ashdown had the necessary means of coercion from the international community 
to implement international goals in BiH. The third section will show that the international 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2009/11/19/nb-04. 
Accessed 5 December 2009.  
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community is not unified in support of Europeanization. I will examine the divisions 
within the international community that led to weakened policies and how local 
politicians such as Serb leader Milorad Dodik have exploited those divisions to oppose 
continued reforms. In the final section I will outline my policy recommendations for the 
international community considering its divisions. The OHR is clearly unpopular with 
Russia and parts of the EU. Russian resistance to continued involvement is detrimental to 
the goal of Europeanization, therefore the replacement of the OHR by the EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) could improve BiH’s relationship to the West, but local 
ownership is still untenable. 
  
 
 
Chapter II  
Nationalist Politics 
 
 Following the war in BiH, the international community implemented the Dayton 
Accords. In order to reach a peace agreement, the international community agreed to 
territorialize BiH’s various ethnic communities. In Dayton’s defense, it is to be 
commended for stopping the conflict in BiH, however, the system established by Dayton 
largely works against the goal of a strong central state with interethnic cooperation. 
Europeanization is fundamentally impossible as long as Dayton exists in its current form. 
On almost every level, Dayton reinforces wartime divisions that hinder sociopolitical 
consolidation.  
 There have been successes under the Dayton system. The most obvious 
accomplishment was the success of the military mission. Peacekeepers isolated the 
warring parties and since then security sector reforms have been largely successful thanks 
to international involvement. BiH now has one army and state-level intelligence 
institutions have been created thanks to international intervention. BiH has not descended 
into chaos and the likelihood of another war right now seems remote.11 The civilian 
mission was also very successful with the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) 
which made it possible for many refugees to return to their prewar homes, but as I will 
explain, serious property issues remain.12 
                                                 
11
 Heinz Vetschera and Matthieu Damian, “Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role 
of the International Community,” International Peacekeeping (March 2006): 28-42.  
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The Consociational Model 
Dayton embodies many ambiguities through the institutions that it setup. 
Journalist David Rieff once stated that, “Dayton is a schizophrenic document.”13 
Dayton’s first priority was to make peace in BiH and lay the groundwork for a unified, 
multiethnic democracy, but Dayton legitimized the military outcomes of the Bosnian 
War. As former Yugoslavia collapsed into various nation states, different ethnic groups 
within BiH successfully carved out territories for themselves. Dayton incorporated these 
divisions by separating BiH into two distinct entities that reflected the outcome of the 
fighting—a Muslim/Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. Not only is BiH divided 
into two entities, but the Federation itself is further divided into ten cantons that roughly 
correspond to the distribution of Croats and Bosniaks within the Federation. Each canton 
has its own ministries with a high level of autonomy. The central state has weak authority 
to govern BiH, plus Dayton’s ethnic voting system strengthens nationalist political 
parties. Dayton gave BiH a consociational power-sharing arrangement in which the three 
main Bosnian minorities, Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks, share power at the state-level 
through a joint, 3-member Presidency. Dayton grants each group the right to veto 
decisions that they feel violate their own national interests. 
Dayton itself is a roadblock to Europeanization in BiH and the international 
community is responsible for allowing it to continue to inhibit BiH’s transition by doing 
nothing. The international community attempted to bring a stable, multiethnic democracy 
                                                                                                                                                 
12
 Mitchell Young, “Laissez-Faire Ethnic Unmixing? The Political Demography of the Property Law 
Implementation Plan in Bosnia–Herzegovina,” Conference Papers -- International Studies 
Association (2006): 1.  
 
13
 “Keeping the Peace.” Available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/bosnia/july-dec97/bosnia_12-
22.html. 
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to BiH with the Dayton Accords, but clearly the consociational power-sharing 
government that Dayton allows has not worked. A multiethnic BiH is an international 
goal, not a local goal. BiH’s is technically democratic (free and fair elections occur) but 
Bosnian democracy based on national divisions only reproduces nationalism. The 
constitution of BiH does not encourage political competition. Dayton defines BiH’s 
political system in national terms. National leaders are not forced to cooperate but may 
instead veto any legislation that they wish. The international community gave the OHR 
the means to correct institutional problems in BiH through the Bonn Powers, but it must 
strike an awkward balance between resolving interethnic (and even intraethnic) disputes 
while also representing international opinion. While the Bonn Powers may be 
undemocratic, avoiding the Bonn Powers does not necessarily mean that Bosnian 
institutions will develop the means to settle disputes themselves. 
The consociational model of power-sharing does not work in BiH. Political 
structures based on national identities perpetuate nationalism. BiH’s collective 
Presidency is based on nationality. The integrative model of power-sharing creates cross-
cutting cleavages among ethnic groups. Integrative power-sharing establishes vote-
pooling that requires political candidates to earn not only a simple majority but also the 
support of a certain percentage of a different minority’s electorate (Horowitz 1985). An 
integrative model of power-sharing could temper local elites in BiH. Unfortunately, local 
elites appear unwilling or unable to change the Dayton system, requiring continued 
international intervention.14 
                                                 
14
 For more on integrative power-sharing, see Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Los Angeles 
and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).  
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 This consociational power-sharing arrangement produces a democratic outcome 
that threatens BiH’s long-term stability. Democratically-elected nationalist elites block 
transitional justice and liberal reforms in some communities. Local elites in both entities 
and many cantons use their power for nationalist purposes to resist refugee return, 
education reform and changes to election law. Progress in each of these areas is 
extremely uneven across BiH, some cantons within the Federation have made substantial 
progress (for example, the Sarajevo canton) while other areas such as the Herzegovina-
Neretva and Zenica-Doboj cantons and the Republika Srpska have made little or no 
progress in each of these areas.  
 
Stagnant Politics 
 Elites have political incentives to use nationalism to block reforms in BiH. 
Political parties in BiH reflect national identity, not political ideology. By opposing 
liberalization on nationalist grounds, local elites are able to horde power for themselves 
in areas where their national minority is in the majority. Attempts to transform the 
Dayton structure would take power away from local elites. Therefore, BiH politicians 
seek out material gains (power, wealth) in a classic case of rent-seeking. Constructivists 
would argue that local politicians seek affirmation from the international community 
(Epstein 2008). It is true that international organizations approach cantonal and entity 
ministers to introduce reforms. Workshops and meetings held by the international 
community in BiH are routinely filled with local elites eager to present themselves to the 
cameras. Today the international community has little influence on elections in BiH 
outside of election monitoring. Unlike other post-communist politicians in countries that 
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introduced democratic reforms for NATO and EU membership, BiH politicians resist the 
long-term affirmation of membership in these international organizations for short-term 
gains.15 Rent-seeking elites have learned that they may maintain power as long as they 
voice the goals of NATO and EU membership. 
 Nationalist political elites use the stagnant political system to block reconciliation 
on many issues. Today, thousands of persons remain displaced within BiH. A recent 
estimate by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) predicts that nearly 
115,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) live within BiH alongside thousands of other 
refugees, asylum-seekers and stateless persons. Some of these individuals face risks in 
returning home.16 Each individual’s circumstances are unique, but the political situation 
in many communities is a factor contributing to the reluctance of many displaced persons 
to return to their prewar homes. Refugees make these decisions based on the political 
realities created by Dayton: Dayton’s ethnic voting system and high degree of local 
autonomy has allowed nationalist elites to consolidate power. For example, in the 2006 
elections nationalist parties defeated moderate competitors. Milorad Dodik’s Serb party, 
the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), and Haris Silajdžić's Bosniak 
Party for BiH (SBiH) won majorities and have been militant towards one another since.17 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Epstein explains the constructivist motivations for politicians to introduce reforms for social gains. See 
Rachel A. Epstein, In Pursuit of Liberalism: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). 
 
16
 UNHCR, “2010 UNHCR country operations profile – Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d766.html. Accessed 17 January 2010.  
 
17
 International Crisis Group, “Bosnia’s Incomplete Transition: Between Dayton and Europe,” Europe 
Report N°198 (9 March 2009): 1-3. 
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Refugee Return and Education Reform 
Refugee return is a necessary step for Europeanization. Transitional justice is vital 
to recovering from the Bosnian War, but refugee return cannot be completed because of 
the realities on the ground in local communities. PLIP requires the return of property to 
former owners, but many people choose to sell their original homes instead of returning 
to their communities or they are completely unable to reclaim their property because it 
has been destroyed. Even where refugee return has occurred, many former refugees 
simply sell their property and move to areas where their national minority is now in the 
majority.  
Refugee return became a major driving force behind education reform for the 
international community. BiH’s nationalist education curricula are a deterrent to refugee 
return in many areas. Ethnic tensions remain and, even worse, are being reinforced in 
schools. In some schools, tensions between ethnic groups have resulted in the permanent 
separation of students based on ethnicity, a model referred to as “two schools under one 
roof.” International organizations such as the OSCE regard two schools under one roof as 
a “lesser and temporary evil” as opposed to placing returning students in classrooms 
where they are the minority. The divisions in the municipality of Stolac in Herzegovina-
Neretva Canton are an excellent example of the negative influence of curriculum in 
certain parts of BiH. Stolac’s Srednja Škola is an infamous example of the “two schools 
under one roof” model. Croat students attend morning classes under the Croat curriculum 
(Croatian language and history) while Bosniak students attend in the afternoon using the 
Bosniak curriculum (Bosnian language and history). There is absolutely no joint 
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administration of the two shifts. Both schools have their own directors, school boards and 
teachers despite using the same facilities. Students are taught nationalist accounts of 
history and Croat students learn that their capital is Zagreb, not Sarajevo.18 Stolac 
illustrates that the current education system reinforces national, not civic, identities. 
 BiH struggles with education reforms because the Dayton Accords reinforce 
nationalist political agendas. Ministries of education across BiH have such broad 
competencies that they are able to resist international pressure. The RS Ministry of 
Education’s competencies include education throughout the RS, while within the 
Federation, the ten separate cantonal ministries administer education. BiH’s national 
divisions influence the agendas of BiH institutions, including the ministries of education, 
schools and municipalities. Following the wars, displaced persons began returning to 
their places of origin throughout BiH, but this placed a severe strain on local 
communities.19  
Teaching history in this environment became a challenge that the international 
community failed to solve. The OHR allowed “national subjects” to be taught that 
include history, mother tongue and religious education. In order to protect the interests of 
minority students, students are still separated by ethnicity for national subjects. Reform 
efforts have no methods of coercion. The international community has been unable to end 
                                                 
18
 “A generation of… ethnically overfed pupils.” 23 August 2009. Available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32527058/. Accessed 18 November 2009; Working Group for Analysis of 
“Two Schools under One Roof” Phenomenon, “Report,” (April 2009), 9. 
 
19
 Education problems have also been a factor for many displaced persons or refugees to decide not to 
return to their prewar homes. 
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two schools under one roof, especially in Zenica-Doboj Canton and Herzegovina-Neretva 
Canton.20 
 The OHR has not used its means of coercion to force communities to comply with 
modern European education guidelines. Many of the necessary legal reforms for 
education already exist on paper in BiH, but local elites exploit Dayton’s weaknesses to 
block access to education or avoid modernizing their education practices. For example, 
after consistent pressure from the OSCE, all the ministers of education (all cantons, both 
entities and the state-level ministry) signed the “framework law on primary and 
secondary education” in 2003 and the Guidelines for writing and evaluation of history 
textbooks for primary and secondary schools in BiH in 2006. These guidelines seek to 
bring Bosnian history curricula and textbooks in line with European guidelines, yet some 
Bosnian textbook authors and municipalities fail to keep nationalist political ideologies 
out of history education.21 The OSCE offers many resources for curriculum reform 
efforts, but the OSCE’s mandate limits its role in BiH to strictly being a mediating 
institution. The OSCE advocates for curriculum reforms in BiH that allow teachers to 
teach their students to analyze each text critically, but implementation of reforms requires 
the participation of local-level leaders. Education, unfortunately, is an issue that the OHR 
                                                 
20
 See Gordana Bozic, “Reeducating the Hearts of Bosnian Students: An Essay on Some Aspects of 
Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” East European Politics and Societies (2006): 319-342. 
 
21
 Heike Karge, 20th Century History in the Textbooks of Bosnia and Herzegovina: An analysis of books 
used for the final grades of primary school, Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research 
(Braunschweig, Germany: 2008): 5. It is important to place these guidelines within their larger institutional 
context. In 2003, the state-level Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education was adopted to 
provide equal access to education for all children. The Guidelines followed the spirit of the Framework 
Law by requiring textbooks to offer a multiperspective approach to history. See also OSCE Mission to BiH, 
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has mostly ignored for years. The OHR has the ability to influence education reform, but 
the OSCE shoulders the majority of the responsibility. 
 The OSCE Mission to BiH recommends policies to schools, municipalities, 
cantonal/entity ministries of education and pedagogical institutes, but the process of 
reform is painstakingly slow. Through the efforts of local historians, the OSCE even 
produced a set of teaching materials regarding national minorities meant to supplement 
existing textbooks, but it is impossible to monitor how and if these materials are used in 
schools.22 Other organizations involved in BiH such as EUROCLIO offer numerous 
conferences and teacher training workshops meant to facilitate discussion about the 
existing curricula. These are extremely valuable efforts, but have been unable to persuade 
some leaders to change the existing curriculum.23 The capacity for reform is limited by 
Dayton because reform relies on the willingness of local leaders to introduce new 
curriculum standards. The international community has given very few incentives for 
education reform. 
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Elections 
 Nationalist politics also complicated elections in some areas. The multiethnic city 
of Mostar embodies many of the larger issues that BiH faces. In 2004, High 
Representative Paddy Ashdown reformed the local consociational power-sharing 
government. Originally, the mayor of Mostar had weak authority to be shared by a deputy 
mayor of a different nationality. Furthermore, the city’s six districts each elected their 
own mayors who altogether with the mayor and deputy mayor comprised an 
administrative board of eight city leaders. At that time, Mostar’s landscape was still 
devastated and public utilities were divided along ethnic lines. Dayton gave the OHR 
special oversight of Mostar, so the OHR terminated the divide by issuing a statute 
granting greater powers to the mayor and ending the offices of the district mayors. 
Mostar held successful elections in 2004 and the situation rapidly improved. Utilities 
were merged, local landmarks were rebuilt and citizens of different nationalities traveled 
freely throughout the city.24 
Unfortunately, Mostar continued to face problems. Under the new statute, 
elections were held on October 5, 2008 for Mostar’s current city council, tasked with 
electing a new mayor by a two-thirds majority. For more than a year and after multiple 
ballots the city council was unable to agree on a mayor or a city budget. The International 
Crisis Group urged the Mostar city council to show leadership and maturity by agreeing 
on a mayor between the two most likely candidates, Ljubo Beslić (HDZ) and Suad 
Hasandedić (SDA). The OHR had the ability to circumvent the legal restrictions placed 
on the city council, but critics believed it was now the responsibility of Bosnian 
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politicians to handle these matters for themselves.25 The international community stood 
by for many months while the democratic process failed. The city council was unable to 
form a two-thirds majority and in later rounds many councilors abstained from voting. 
Mostar went without a mayor for fourteen months. Ultimately, the current High 
Representative Valentin Inzko decided to use the OHR’s authority to unilaterally relax 
the restrictions placed on the Mostar city council. In a Bonn Power decision issued in 
December 2009, the OHR amended the election law to allow a simple majority of those 
present and voting to elect the mayor. Beslić was elected on December 18.26 
 Mostar should be a lesson about international intervention in BiH in general. 
Ideally, the Mostar city council would solve its election crisis by itself, but the OHR had 
the ability to ease the legal requirements and still did nothing for more than a year. 
Instead of engaging the problem, international institutions chose to stay out of the 
political dispute. The OHR allowed the Mostar city council to fail to elect a mayor 
seventeen times in fourteen months. This should be a warning sign to all critics that a 
similar process could unfold at the state level if the international community withdrew. 
The eventual involvement of the OHR in the electoral process is not ideal, but the 
outcome is democratic, Beslić was elected by a simple majority. This outcome was not 
possible without amendments that only an outside institution such as the OHR could 
make without appearing biased. The OHR is the only institution in BiH with the 
legitimacy to amend the election law unilaterally, so like constitutional reform, the 
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international community deserves partial blame for the repeated failure of the democratic 
process in Mostar.  
The Mostar mayoral election also demonstrates that reforming the Dayton system 
will require substantial help from the international community. The OHR provides an 
independent voice on Bosnian politics, so it must engage these types of problems by 
offering solutions. The solution to Mostar’s election crisis was not extreme, but the OHR 
was the only institution in BiH willing to implement it. Therefore, the answer is not to 
merely change the Dayton system, but to change it so that power-sharing institutions have 
a legal means of resolving future disputes. In Mostar’s case, there was no legal 
framework to find a solution to the problem, so the city council deadlocked. A similar 
election crisis at the state-level could be solved by a strong, independent state-level 
judiciary able to overcome national interests.  
Some within the international community have recognized the problems inherent 
in the Dayton Accords. Efforts have been made to reform the institutions established 
under the Dayton Constitution. In sections three and four I will show some of these 
efforts. Unfortunately, the international community for the most part has been as passive 
in reforming the Dayton system as it has been in dealing with the problems created by it.  
  
 
 
Chapter III  
The Use of the Bonn Powers 
 
When the Bonn Powers began, the OHR could impose decisions that were backed 
up by foreign SFOR peacekeeping troops, but SFOR’s mandate ended and international 
support for continued involvement dwindled. Without other support, the OHR only has a 
normative influence, placing the OHR in a precarious situation in which it must rely on 
Bosnians to respect the legitimacy of a foreign institution. Is unified normative influence 
from the international community sufficient for interethnic cooperation and state-
building? In BiH today that is a hypothetical question because even the OHR’s limited 
normative influence is being second-guessed by members of the international community 
who disagree with the OHR’s political ability to intervene when Bosnian politics need a 
course correction. Consequently, the international community’s role is becoming 
increasingly uncertain (and arguably ineffective) in BiH. The fragmentation of the 
international community regarding BiH is to blame. The OHR can do very little because 
of weak international political support for continued intervention.  
At its core, the OHR is a political institution imposed by the international 
community on the Bosnian people as a part of a solution to their conflict. Its legitimacy is 
based on Dayton, a foreign document created by international negotiations, and the PIC’s 
decision to grant the OHR the ability to “use his final authority in theatre regarding 
interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement 
in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding [my emphasis] 
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decisions” (the Bonn Powers).27 These facts do not sit well with foreign governments, 
and rightly so. The OHR’s mission, however, relies on international support to be 
effective. As an international institution created by a coalition of foreign governments, 
the OHR’s policies must respond to international opinion. World governments are losing 
interest in continued involvement in BiH. The High Representative answers to no one 
within BiH, but the Bonn Powers and general involvement in BiH are losing popularity in 
the court of international public opinion. 
While skeptics are correct that BiH will never be a full-fledged democracy as long 
as the OHR remains open, the end of international involvement in BiH is not the solution, 
by itself. Those in the West who object to international involvement in BiH miss the 
point: countries unable to manage their own transitions independently need international 
institutions with a realistic means of coercion to promote transition goals, in this case 
peace implementation and Europeanization. Without boots on the ground, strong 
economic incentives or even concerted political pressure to introduce reforms, 
international intervention is half-hearted. Full local ownership of the political process in 
BiH would be extremely dangerous. Local elites still have nationalist agendas that are 
only partially checked by the international community’s presence. In my opinion this is 
an old theme in Bosnian politics. Local elites have often appeared to “play ball” with the 
international community while secretly pursuing their own agendas, hoping if they 
outwait the international community then they will achieve their goals.  
Conditionality arguments applied to other transition states now in the EU and 
NATO in Central and Eastern Europe do not apply to BiH. Instead of assuming that states 
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in the Western Balkans are willing to do whatever is necessary to join international 
economic and security institutions, NATO and the EU must realize that states like BiH 
will require active pressure to institute reforms. The conditionality literature emphasizes 
that elites require incentives to institute reforms (Vachudova 2005, Pop-Eleches 2007). In 
Central Europe, membership in the EU alone was enough incentive for post-communist 
states to reform. Elites were either receptive to the terms of membership in international 
organizations such as the EU or voters replaced them with elites who were, but in a 
multinational post-conflict environment such as BiH, political elites reify the nationalist 
concerns of the Bosnian public. EU membership is desired, but discussion is framed in 
nationalist terms making compromise more difficult.28  
Political conditionality and the potential for EU market access have produced 
limited results. The international community in BiH struggles to use carrots and sticks 
effectively. Bosnian politicians are aware of the conditionality imposed by organizations 
such as the EU and NATO, but Bosnian voters do not force political elites to institute 
sweeping changes as long as they at least voice goals of European integration. The EU 
has the potential to use more aggressive financial incentives such as greater market 
access or foreign direct investment but has failed to do so. 
Seven High Representatives have overseen BiH since the Dayton Peace Accords 
were signed in 1995. Each High Representative had a different relationship with Bosnian 
politicians. Some have understood the OHR’s necessity in guiding Bosnian institutions 
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that are incapable of reforming themselves. As Joseph argues, BiH’s setbacks “are proof 
that outsiders doing less does not necessarily translate into locals doing more.”29 More 
recent High Representatives have been forced to pick their battles with local politicians, 
choosing to exert the Bonn Powers only when it was realistically possible to do so. Some 
of the earlier High Representatives, however, frequently exercised the full authority of 
their office, notably the second and fourth High Representatives, Carlos Westendorp and 
Paddy Ashdown. Both High Representatives used the Bonn Powers frequently to impose 
necessary laws and remove politicians that obstructed international goals. Ashdown, 
especially, understood that “you can’t build loyalty, and you can’t build identity, 
especially after a war of genocide and ethnic annihilation, overnight. This is a process, 
it’s not an event.”30 
 
Carlos Westendorp 
Westendorp became High Representative in 1997 and faced nationalist politicians 
who hampered international involvement. Westendorp dismissed RS President Nikola 
Poplasen in March 1999 when he attempted to unseat RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik. 
At that time, Dodik was perceived as a relative moderate: nationalist, but willing to work 
with the international community. The OHR cited Poplasen’s attempts to circumvent the 
OHR’s constitutional decision requiring civilian control of the armed forces. Poplasen 
also attacked the legitimacy of the OHR and obstructed Dayton’s implementation by 
refusing to recognize election results within the RS. In a written statement, the OHR 
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legitimized Poplasen’s removal by citing that the Peace Implementation Council’s 
meeting in Bonn “authorized the High Representative to take actions against persons 
holding public office who are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal 
commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms of its implementation.”31 
Westendorp used the Bonn Powers regularly against mayors and police who obstructed 
refugee return, but Poplasen’s dismissal angered Serbs and the Rump Yugoslav 
government. The objections were no different from those made today. The Milošević 
government asserted that it was “an illegal act, an act of unprecedented wilfulness [sic], 
and the most serious violation of the letter and spirit of the Dayton and Paris accords, the 
Serb Republic constitution, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina constitution thus far."32 The 
situation was delicate, but the OHR’s control of the situation was not in doubt. When 
Westendorp served as High Representative a significant number of SFOR peacekeepers 
were stationed in BiH to maintain order. Their presence lent a physical means of coercion 
to the OHR, which legitimized the Bonn Powers.  
 
Paddy Ashdown 
 Paddy Ashdown was a target of critics for his use of the Bonn Powers as High 
Representative from 2002 to 2006. Almost from the beginning of his office, international 
skeptics criticized him for prolonging the use of the Bonn Powers. The European 
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Stability Initiative, a think tank based out of Berlin, was one of Ashdown’s most vocal 
opponents for the continuation of the Bonn Powers, arguing that the Bosnian state could 
not develop as long as BiH remained an international protectorate.33 Ashdown, however, 
used the Bonn Powers to advance Europeanization when local politics went dangerously 
awry. Ashdown’s immediate predecessor, Wolfgang Petritsch, encouraged the 
development of non-nationalist political parties such as the Alliance for Change coalition 
after the November 2000 elections. Unfortunately, these efforts failed and nationalist 
politicians soon returned to power.34  
Ashdown feared that local politicians were derailing Dayton’s implementation. In 
a single day in 2003 Ashdown removed 60 Bosnian Serb politicians from office for 
refusal to hand over war criminal Radovan Karadžić.35 Critics of continued international 
intervention railed against Ashdown for their removal. The ESI responded by releasing 
an extremely controversial report calling Ashdown an imperialist who ruled BiH as a 
“raj,” similar to the British rule of India. Ashdown furiously denounced the report, 
arguing that control of Bosnian institutions was slowly being handed over to local 
leaders. The Economist reported that polls showed that Bosnians themselves remained 
skeptical of both their own politicians and the international community throughout the 
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entire incident, but institutions never ground to a halt and the OHR’s authority was 
recognized.36 
 The ESI report written by Knaus and Martin was the first major report to criticize 
the OHR. The OHR’s position substantially weakened following the Knaus and Martin 
article. Each High Representative confronts unique circumstances, but still no High 
Representative since Paddy Ashdown used the Bonn Powers as frequently. The situation 
steadily worsened until High Representatives were in a very precarious position to 
enforce democratic reform in Bosnian politics.  
 
Lajčák and Inzko 
The OHR was hung out to dry. Recent High Representatives Miroslav Lajčák and 
Valentin Inzko received tepid support. For example, Lajčák attempted to finalize the 
conditions necessary for a Stablization and Association Agreement (SAA) between the 
EU and BiH. Despite improvements in the Bosnian police, local leaders resisted 
conditions for an SAA set by the EU. Police districts follow political boundaries. Lajčák 
attempted to use the authority of the OHR to force local elites to reform the police 
boundaries, but the EU ignored the OHR and signed an SAA with BiH without the 
required reforms.37 The PIC wants to close the OHR and transition entirely to an EU 
Special Representative (EUSR), but within BiH the RS is unwilling to cede its relative 
autonomy to the state. Now the OHR is unable to take a convincing stand on this issue 
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without international support. Consequently, a recent International Crisis Group report 
argues that the OHR is now more of a problem in Bosnian politics than a facilitator of 
disputes.38 
By the time that Lajčák left office in March 2009, inflammatory rhetoric against 
the state and other minorities was so prevalent from Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik 
that Lajčák remarked that, “Does anyone serious really believe that Dodik’s removal 
would resolve the problems in BiH? Here is my answer: at this moment, it would create 
so many problems that the very existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be 
jeopardised! [sic]”39 Support for state institutions and cooperation between entities and 
cantons failed to materialize. After Ashdown, High Representatives began to hesitate to 
use the Bonn Powers, emboldening Bosnian politicians, particularly Milorad Dodik. 
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Chapter IV  
The End of Liberal Imperialism? 
 
 By Dayton’s tenth anniversary in 2005, local politicians in BiH were under 
intense political pressure from the international community to introduce constitutional 
reforms. It was widely acknowledged that a path for BiH into the EU was not possible 
without significant constitutional reforms that integrated BiH’s entities and strengthened 
central Bosnian state institutions. In other words, international and local leaders agreed 
that the Dayton framework clearly needed reforms. This was a critical moment in BiH’s 
development. Former Deputy High Representative Donald Hayes began work with the 
US Institute for Peace and leaders of all Bosnian political parties to develop key 
constitutional reforms. The negotiations went slowly, but by April 2006 the working 
group developed a set of amendments that would have reduced the Bosnian Presidency to 
one member, doubled the size of the Parliament, increased the authority of the state-level 
Council of Ministers and created state ministries of agriculture and technology and the 
environment. 
 These reforms, nicknamed the “April Package,” stalled in the Bosnian Parliament. 
The leader of SBiH, Haris Silajdžić, was the only party leader to reject the reforms, 
arguing that they did not weaken the entities. The Bosniaks have consistently worked to 
reduce the autonomy of the RS and Federation in favor of stronger state-level institutions 
in BiH, so it was unlikely that Silajdžić would support a proposal that did not weaken the 
entities, but members of other parties also opposed the April Package. A faction of the 
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Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) split off to form their own group, HDZ 1990, that 
allied with members of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA). The April Package soon 
failed because its supporters could not muster enough votes in Parliament.40 
 The OHR was already involved in this process and had the opportunity to force 
modest constitutional reforms past the Parliament and into Bosnian law at that precise 
moment, but decided to refrain from imposing any reforms. The debate over international 
involvement in BiH had convinced many governments that using the Bonn Powers would 
be unwise. The Knaus and Martin argument clearly had an influence on decision makers 
in European capitals. Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling became BiH’s fifth High 
Representative in January 2006. Schwarz-Schilling described the High Representative’s 
role in BiH as a total contrast to Paddy Ashdown’s aggressive intervention in BiH. While 
Ashdown believed that intervention was necessary, Schwarz-Schilling argued that the 
High Representative should act as an “adviser” in Bosnian politics.41 The April Package 
was a concrete proposal that would have made measurable improvements in BiH, but in 
the end Schwarz-Schilling allowed constitutional reforms to fail. 
  Schwarz-Schilling’s contrasting style to Ashdown illustrates the differences 
among the members of the international community with interests in BiH’s democratic 
transition. Both men clearly have distinguished records of public service with 
connections to policy circles in the British and German governments. Ashdown served 
several terms as a Liberal member of the British Parliament and as Leader of the Liberal 
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Democrats before retiring from the House of Commons in 2001.42 Schwarz-Schilling 
undoubtedly has connections inside the German government after years of membership in 
the German Christian Democratic Union and serving as telecommunications minister 
under Helmut Kohl from 1982-1992. His policy of indirectness blatantly draws on Knaus 
and Martin’s argument that the OHR’s use of the Bonn Powers is a modern example of 
liberal imperialism. In fact, Gerald Knaus acted as Schwarz-Schilling’s adviser 
throughout his BiH “mediation.”  
 
Ending the OHR? 
The British government, consequently, has taken a lonely stance toward the Bonn 
Powers and the OHR’s continuation in recent years. During Ashdown’s time as High 
Representative, the British Foreign Office unabashedly supported the OHR’s use of the 
Bonn Powers to remove local politicians from office. When Ashdown ended the RS 
Supreme Defense Council in 2003, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw openly praised 
Ashdown’s decision, stressing that “the UK Government fully supports efforts 
throughout the region to take forward the difficult and substantive reforms required for it 
to realise [sic] its full potential."43 Ashdown hoped to be the last High Representative, but 
by the end of his term it was clear that the OHR’s mission in BiH was far from over.  
On June 23, 2006, Schwarz-Schilling and the Peace Implementation Council 
boldly stated that the OHR would close on June 30, 2007, explaining that “the nature of 
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[international community] involvement in BiH had to change as BiH moved from peace 
implementation to Euro-Atlantic integration,” despite the April Package’s failure in the 
Bosnian Parliament.44 Paddy Ashdown vehemently called for the OHR to remain open 
beyond 2007 and 2008, with support from British Foreign Secretary David Milibrand.45 
The PIC repeatedly urged local politicians to pass constitutional reforms, but it was 
obvious within months that the international community could not motivate local elites to 
pass reforms themselves with words alone. Ultimately, the OHR did not close as 
scheduled. The German government publicly remained silent on these developments as 
they occurred.46  
BiH has certainly made some very admirable progress in recent years, but to 
assume that central BiH institutions are poised to take over full responsibility for running 
their country on the road to NATO and EU accession is delusional. Since Ashdown left 
the post of High Representative, BiH has been unable to complete the largest and most 
important steps toward becoming a sustainable democracy. The international community 
was successful in a number of areas by using direct intervention. Why should 
constitutional reform—arguably the largest and most important reform attempted to date 
by the international community in BiH—be any different? The reform process clearly 
stalled when the OHR changed tactics between Ashdown and Schwarz-Schilling. The 
                                                 
44
 OHR, “Communique by the PIC Steering Board – Towards Ownership: From Peace Implementation to 
Euro-Atlantic Integration.” 23 June 2006. Available at 
http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=37503. Accessed 9 February 2010. 
 
45
 OHR, “PIC Calls For A Renewed Focus On Constitutional Reform.” 4 October 2006. Available at 
http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=38217. Accessed 9 February 2010; OHR, “Communiqué by 
the PIC Steering Board.” 27 February 2007. Available at 
http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=39236. Accessed 9 February 2010; David Miliband, 
“Balkans.” 29 October 2008. Available at http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/roller/miliband/entry/balkans. Accessed 9 
February 2010. 
 
46
 “Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 18 December 2009. Available at http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/en/Europa/Suedosteuropa/BosnienHerzegowina.html. Accessed 10 February 2010.  
  
 
33 
 
 
 
international community’s split over continued intervention handicapped the reform 
process. Many Bosnian politicians are extremely adept at telling international leaders in 
places like Berlin what they want to hear: that progress has been made and the last major 
obstacle to EU accession is constitutional reform.  
Constitutional reform is not a simple process that could be carried out quickly in a 
few months, allowing the OHR to close. Many members of the international community 
still have not learned this lesson. Russia, in particular, pushes strongly for an end to 
international involvement in BiH. In November 2009, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov called for an end to the Bonn Powers and the closure of the OHR, saying, “we 
believe that the people of Bosnia must take their country’s destiny into their own 
hands.”47 The PIC was unable to set a date for closing the OHR at their meeting held later 
that month, but by prematurely and repeatedly calling for the end of international 
intervention in BiH, the international community has made Europeanization even more 
difficult. Stronger central institutions are necessary for Europeanization. Local ownership 
of the reform process is irresponsible in a country such as BiH without strong power-
sharing institutions, but the international community’s declining interest in BiH signals to 
local elites that they can continue to resist reforms. 
 
Local Politics 
Local elites took some initiative by making their own attempts at constitutional 
reform, but their efforts failed. In January 2009, the leaders of the SDA (Sulejman Tihić), 
SNSD (Dodik) and HDZ (Dragan Čović) produced an agreement that would have 
allegedly divided BiH into four territorial units with their own legislative, executive and 
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judicial authority. The agreement also supposedly proposed a way to transfer state 
property to these units. The discussions among the party leaders became known as the 
Prud Process, but the three parties did not have the necessary majority in Parliament, 
leading Inzko to declare that the Prud Process is now “basically dead.”48 
Local politicians who failed to implement constitutional reforms after years of 
international intervention began openly criticizing the international community’s attempts 
to reform the Dayton constitution. The critique of international involvement by Bosnian 
politicians is not a new phenomenon, but the argument underwent a paradigmatic shift. 
Early on, local elites attempted to block implementation of the Dayton Accords, but as 
the implementation process was completed the Dayton constitution became a barrier to 
Europeanization. Instead of attacking Dayton’s implementation, some local elites actively 
defended the BiH constitution precisely because it granted nationalists autonomy.  
One of the most vocal proponents of the Dayton constitution is RS Prime Minister 
Milorad Dodik. Dodik initially appealed to the international community by not being a 
hard line nationalist. The international community supported Dodik because he basically 
did not obstruct implementation of the Dayton Accords. Dodik’s nationalist credentials 
were unmistakable, but that made him no different from most politicians in BiH 
following the war. The OHR praised Dodik’s original cooperation with international 
attempts to arbitrate ownership of the municipality of Brčko in northeastern BiH between 
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the RS and Muslim/Croat Federation. In March 1999, the Brčko Arbitral Tribunal 
released a statement saying that, “without RS Prime Minister Dodik's pro-Dayton efforts 
during the past year, the Tribunal might have been obligated to award Brcko [sic] 
outright to the Federation.” That same day, Carlos Westendorp removed RS President 
Nikola Poplasen from office for trying to remove Dodik from the post of RS Prime 
minister.49 
 Dodik’s amicable relationship with the international community, however, 
eventually faded. Dodik was out of office for much of Paddy Ashdown’s tenure as High 
Representative, but before Dodik returned to office he began to severely criticize the 
international community. Unlike Silajdžić, Dodik supported the April Package, but after 
it failed he was politically unwilling to endorse constitutional reforms, instead using the 
Dayton constitution as a pretense for the autonomy of the RS. Dodik once criticized the 
international community along with other nationalities within BiH for moving toward 
greater centralization of BiH institutions by saying, “we're not the ones working to 
undermine Dayton or threatening the existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in that way. We 
just want to be inside -- and nothing else.”50 
 Dodik exploits the divisions in the international community to perpetuate the 
status quo within BiH. The international community and local leaders such as Dodik both 
began to openly consider moving from peace implementation to Euro-Atlantic 
                                                 
49
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integration, but the international community did not apply sustained political pressure on 
Bosnian leaders to implement constitutional reforms. Dodik’s ideas about BiH’s 
integration did not involve constitutional reform. Dodik took advantage of the debate 
over continued international involvement in BiH by calling for local ownership in the 
political process and criticizing the use of the Bonn Powers, particularly their use by 
Paddy Ashdown, whom Dodik blames for BiH’s stagnant political situation.51 Ideally, 
local ownership would be a good thing, but Dodik’s mistrust of central Bosnian 
institutions and flagrant Serb nationalism threatens to perpetuate BiH’s system of rent-
seeking for the foreseeable future. The international community is now unable to agree 
on a course of action for Europeanization. Once pressure to pass constitutional reforms 
relented, Dodik boldly stood up against the international community. Dodik rejected the 
OHR’s attempts to reform the Dayton system and even suggested that it was within the 
rights of the RS to secede from BiH on the principle of self-determination.  
 Dodik’s emboldened stance frustrated recent international efforts to reform the 
Dayton constitution. In October 2009, leaders from the US and EU held a summit with 
Bosnian leaders at the Butmir NATO base near Sarajevo. On hand for the negotiations 
were US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli 
Rehn and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt. Leading into the negotiations, the 
international community applied political pressure on local elites to consent to 
constitutional reforms. The summit’s goal was to reach an agreement on constitutional 
reforms in order to allow the November meeting of the PIC to set a deadline for the 
closing of the OHR. If the PIC was ready to discuss closing the OHR, then they were 
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ready to sign off on BiH’s completion of the PIC’s 5 objectives + 2 conditions necessary 
for closing the OHR if Butmir produced constitutional reforms.52 Despite several weeks 
of negotiations, Dodik and other BiH leaders failed to agree to constitutional reforms. 
Dodik refused to accommodate reforms that would strengthen central Bosnian 
institutions, saying that BiH is not only an unsustainable state, but that the RS is “not 
interested in Bosnian constitutional changes.” For example, Dodik rebuked a proposal 
from the SDA’s leader Sulejman Tihić to incorporate a Supreme Court into the 
constitution, asserting that the RS also deserved the right to a referendum to secede from 
BiH.53 
 EU and US negotiators at Butmir had a consensus that they were unwilling to give 
the RS the ability to secede from BiH, but deep divisions between the US and Europe still 
existed that wrecked the Butmir talks. Journalists noted a rift forming between policy in 
Washington and the general opinion of leaders in Brussels toward the continuation of the 
OHR. The EU signalled its desire to close the OHR after 14 years of failure to produce a 
stable state. US policy circles, in contrast, seemed less supportive of the OHR's closure.54 
International officials lambasted Dodik for asserting that the RS has a right to a secession 
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referendum, but ultimately Dodik refused to compromise. The international community 
was unwilling to impose a decision so the Butmir talks ended without an agreement.  
 Butmir's failure strengthens Dodik's position. Dodik obstructs the centralization of 
the Bosnian state and clearly wants to see the OHR closed, which is most likely a major 
factor why the PIC decided to avoid setting a closure deadline at its November 2009 
meeting. On paper, the international community has acheived peace implementation. BiH 
has been at peace for 15 years with no immediate signs of a return to conflict. 
Furthermore, democratic, power-sharing institutions exist throughout BiH that are the 
result of free and fair elections. In other words, BiH is officially a peaceful, multiethnic 
democracy. As a result, the international community is gradually losing interest in 
sustained intervention in BiH. Dodik must support Dayton's framework for peace, but he 
is under increasingly less pressure to reform the Bosnian state.  
Dayton's goal is to bring peace to BiH and attempt to setup a multiethnic 
democracy, agendas that Dodik has supported, but now that they have been accomplished 
he is under no real pressure to continue reforms. At the Butmir talks, the EU and US 
negotiators promised not to impose an international decision on BiH. The outcome 
should be unsurprising—Dodik simply had no reason to change his position. Despite 
political pressure from the international community on Bosnian politicians to agree to 
constitutional reforms, the international community lacked the resolve to impose any new 
decisions developed at the talks. Without this threat, Bosnian politicians knew that the 
status quo would continue as long as they outwaited the international community. In the 
midst of the negotiations, the US and Swedish Ambassadors to BiH along with the Head 
of Delegation of the European Commission to BiH issued statements urging Bosnian 
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politicians to take advantage of the opportunities presented at Butmir, but by publicly 
considering the closure of the OHR, the EU played into Dodik's hands and undermined 
their own leverage.55   
                                                 
55
 Bosnia Daily, 14 October 2009. 
  
 
Chapter V  
Policy Recommendations 
 
 Nothing will change in BiH until the OHR closes or the international community 
allows it to drastically change its policies. Today, the OHR's closure seems much more 
likely than a return to actively using the Bonn Powers. Implementation of the Dayton 
Accords is virtually completed, but now the Dayton Constitution blocks further 
Europeanization in BiH, so it is time to reform it. Unfortunately, after almost fifteen 
years many international governments are losing interest in the sustained pressure 
necessary to make the OHR an effective institution today. Members of the international 
community want to decrease the role of the OHR in Bosnian politics because they feel 
that its authority over Bosnian institutions represents a gross violation of BiH's 
sovereignty. Opponents acknowledge the international community's influence but 
recognize that local politicians will not pursue constitutional reforms any further by 
themselves. 
 As I have argued in this paper, the international community stood together to 
implement peace in BiH, but fractured over the OHR's role in Europeanization. Reforms 
have not progressed evenly in BiH, making it impossible for the international community 
to withdraw at this stage. Resistance against reforms from local politicians in BiH is a 
symptom of a larger, related problem: the international community's involvement failed 
in BiH. Nationalist concerns mask political competition and block reconciliation. 
Removing the tools of coercion meant to encourage the growth of a unified state is 
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detrimental. As much as skeptics may wish to see the end of international intervention in 
BiH, the defiance of the central state of BiH and international institutions by BiH 
politicians should be extreme cause for concern. The international community's goal of a 
unified Bosnian state is currently in danger. The hesistance of the international 
community to support the OHR's use of the Bonn Powers emboldens politicians who 
oppose strong central institutions. 
 The OHR is currently the only foreign institution in BiH with the political 
authority to impose decisions and remove politicians, but it has not used this power 
sufficiently, especially in recent years. Local politicians use their autonomy given to them 
by Dayton to resist reforms. Today, thousands of persons remain displaced in BiH, but 
the OHR has done little to improve conditions for refugee return. Education reform 
would improve conditions for refugee return in many areas, but the OSCE constitutes the 
brunt of the international community's involvement in BiH education. The work that the 
OSCE does is necessary for the formation of a Bosnian civic identity, but it has had little 
support from other institutions capable of ensuring the success of education reforms in 
BiH, such as the OHR. Despite the (over)emphasis on free and fair elections by the 
international community, election problems remain in areas such as Mostar, yet the OHR 
waited months to intervene with a simple decision.  
 BiH is now at a crossroads. The international community completed its Dayton 
goals to bring peace to BiH and setup a consociational power-sharing democracy. There 
is no immediate threat of violence and free and fair elections occur regularly. 
Unfortunately, Dayton is not a document that provides a framework for EU accession. 
The Dayton Constitution territorializes the outcomes of ethnic violence and establishes a 
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power-sharing system that does not force political leaders to compromise with members 
of other national minorities. The consociational model, therefore, is insufficient and must 
be reformed, but BiH's nationalist politicians have no reason to change it. Responsibility 
for reform rests with the international community which must intervene to impose a 
constitution on BiH that institutes an integrative power-sharing arrangement that crosses 
ethnic lines.  
Local politicians recognize that the international community is divided over the 
OHR's continued involvement in BiH. The OHR has nearly unlimited authority in BiH on 
paper, but in reality without international support in the form of political pressure or 
peacekeeping troops it lacks the means of coercion to enforce decisions. Europeanization 
cannot continue until the international community gives the OHR the teeth to impose 
constitutional reforms. If the international community does nothing or, even worse, 
withdraws from BiH, nationalist tensions are likely to only continue. A strong central 
state does not exist in BiH. Considering the national animosities, it will take international 
involvement to make a strong central state a reality. It is not my intention to play 
“Monday morning quarterback” regarding the decisions that the international community 
made (and has not made) in BiH, however, Bosnian institutions have repeatedly 
demonstrated that they are unable to guide universal democratic reforms or carry out 
transitional justice. Blame for these failures should be shared by the international 
community and unresponsive local elites.  
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Realistically, there are now two options: the international community may 
reinvest resources in the OHR or transition entirely to an EU Special Representative.56 
Strengthening the OHR would require stronger bilateral support from some of the larger 
EU countries. An EU consensus for this option is unlikely (especially with Russian 
support) and the larger EU members are divided over the OHR. The second option is to 
replace the OHR with a more aggressive EUSR dedicated to constitutional reform. 
Unlike the OHR, the EUSR would isolate Russian resistance to continued intervention 
since Russia is not an EU country. Many skeptics are calling for an end to all 
international intervention in BiH, but for this option it is critical that the international 
community reaffirms that intervention is still vital to peace and Europeanization in BiH. 
Complete local ownership of the political process would still be extremely irresponsible 
today. Election reform, education reform and refugee return should demonstrate to the 
international community that BiH institutions are still not ready to stand on their own.  
Therefore, ending the OHR would require an EUSR with the authority to extend 
larger carrots. International intervention in BiH has strong American and British political 
support, but the US and UK are unlikely to redeploy forces to the Balkans short of 
another armed conflict. Hopefully, additional EUFOR troops will not be necessary in 
BiH, but more major European capitals must come together to show stronger support for 
the authority of international institutions working in BiH. Normative pressure has failed 
and additional peacekeeping troops are unlikely, so the EU and NATO must consider 
larger financial incentives.  
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Bosnian elites have repeatedly demonstrated that they respond to material 
incentives, presenting a potential solution but additional problems. Potential EU 
membership appears insufficient, so the international community must adopt an 
aggressive financial policy in return for interethnic reconciliation. Instead of assuming 
that the potential for EU market access is an incentive for elites, actually extending 
greater market access in return for political tradeoffs such as constitutional reform could 
produce significant results. Doing so would require the EU to loosen its market 
restrictions and might hamper EU leverage with other nations, but market tradeoffs are a 
more realistic policy in dealing with intractable elites in a relatively tiny economy. 
Greater foreign aid and direct investment for infrastructure developments in return for 
reforms are also possible, but create problems. BiH is a heavily corrupt country where 
transparency is low and patronage networks are prevalent. Managing the flow of capital 
into BiH would require strict oversight using the EUSR’s institutional capacity.  
EU expansion fatigue and the current economic crisis are also serious factors to 
be considered. The latest round of EU expansion in 2007 brought BiH’s Balkan 
neighbors Romania and Bulgaria into the EU, states with wild corruption not unlike BiH. 
The EU should legitimately be concerned about similar problems in BiH. The economic 
costs imposed by expansion dissuade EU voters from favoring the accession of additional 
countries such as BiH. Market access and monetary aid to BiH would place strains on the 
EU economy at a time when the global banking sector is in turmoil.  
Skeptics, however, should remember that the EU has already taken a very large 
stake in the future of the Western Balkans. The EU recognized that NATO and EU 
accession are in the best interests of BiH when it began sending aid and supporting 
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institutions there. BiH is also a small country whose impact on the EU economy could be 
absorbed. Finally, the time horizon for BiH to actually complete reforms is likely very 
long. It will still be many years before Bosnian elites will complete all the stages 
necessary for EU accession, so it is unlikely that the EUSR will be able to implement 
multiple infrastructure projects in BiH within a short time period. 
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